India’s Malabar Dilemma

Speculations are rife about India possibly inviting Australia for the next Malabar naval exercise—which COVID-19 has caused to be moved to 2021.[1] If true, this would represent a break from the past and signal a change in the Asian strategic environment. Over the past few years, India has consistently resisted including Australia in the exercise, despite the latter’s willingness. The only other time that Australia was included in the Malabar exercises, along with Singapore and Japan, was in 2007.[2] This brief examines the debate around Malabar in the context of the evolving Australia-India-Japan-US Quadrilateral or Quad. It argues that New Delhi’s possible inclusion of Canberra in the next Malabar exercise would not only represent a logical progression of an Indian foreign policy shift amidst structural changes in the region, but also a signal to the world that India is willing to play the role it perceives for itself in both the global and regional stage.


Attribution: Harsh V Pant and Anant Singh Mann, “India’s Malabar Dilemma,” ORF Issue Brief No. 393, August 2020, Observer Research Foundation.


A Hesitant Beginning

The United States (US) and India instituted the annual Malabar exercises in 1992.[3] Following the diplomatic fallout of India’s nuclear tests of 1998, the frequency of the bilateral exercises dwindled, only regaining their regularity after 2004 (See Table 1). In 2007 the bilateral accord expanded its scope to include other key Asian states like Australia, Japan and Singapore. More importantly, in the same year, the US, Japan, Australia and India converged in the ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue’ (or Quad).[4] Beijing protested the accord, calling it an “Anti-China coalition”.[5]

What would later be known as Quad 1.0 lost its momentum soon after its inception as Australia withdrew, and sought to instead prioritise its relationship with China.[6] Australia’s Minister for Defence Brendon Nelson stated in July 2007 that he had “reassured China that [the] so-called security quadrilateral dialogue with India is not something we are pursuing.”[7] Soon after, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe—a champion of the Quad—resigned in September 2007.[8] The US in December 2007 then declared that it was prioritising its trilateral engagement with Japan and Australia, over the new quadrilateral initiative.[9]  For its part, New Delhi’s principle of strategic autonomy made it sceptical of such an arrangement, viewing it as a threat to policy manoeuvrability.

While Quad 1.0 was essentially put on the backburner over the following decade, India-US engagement continued with the bilateral Malabar exercises taking place annually (See Table 1). It was not until 2015 that the Malabar exercises elevated Japan’s status as a ‘permanent member’.[10] China again vehemently protested this trilateral engagement and said that “relevant countries should not provoke confrontation and create tension in the region.”[11]

Table 1: Participants, location and duration of Malabar Exercises, 1992-2020

Year Participants Location Duration
1992 India-USA Off India’s West Coast 1 day
1995 India-USA Persian Gulf 1 day
1996 India-USA Off Kochi 2 days
2002[12] India-USA Arabian Sea 4 days
2003 India-USA Off Kochi 3 days
2004 India-USA Off Goa 8 days
2005 India-USA Off Kochi 8 days
2006 India-USA Off Goa 11 days
2007, April India-USA Philippine Sea 4 days
2007, Sept. India-USA-Japan-Australia-Singapore Bay of Bengal 6 days
2008 India-USA Arabian Sea 10 days
2009 India-USA-Japan Off Okinawa 6 days
2010 India-USA Off Goa 7 days
2011 India-USA Off Okinawa 5 days
2012 India-USA Bay of Bengal 7 days
2013 India-USA Off Vishakhapatnam 6 days
2014[13] India-USA-Japan Off Nagasaki 6 days
2015[14] India-USA-Japan Bay of Bengal 6 days
2016[15] India-USA-Japan Philippine Sea 4 days
2017[16] India-USA-Japan Bay of Bengal 8 days
2018[17] India-USA-Japan Off the coast of Guam 10 days
2019[18] India-USA-Japan Off the coast of Japan 9 days
2020[19]/2021[a] India-USA-Japan-Australia[b] Bay of Bengal[c]

Over the past decade, as the Indo-Pacific region faced increasing security challenges, the Quad states have also heightened their congruity in foreign policy.  Their shared issues include terrorism, maritime piracy, and more importantly, threats to the rules-based order underlying a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’.[20] More pertinently, the ‘China factor’—which was key to the failure of Quad 1.0 to take off—just a decade later appears to be serving as the pivot around which the Quad 2.0 minilateralism[21] is seeking a rejuvenation. In the decade since 2007, a rising Chinese belligerence in its land and maritime disputes, the increasingly questionable intent of its One Belt, One Road (OBOR) programme, and its related debt trap diplomacy have only further upended the thesis of a “peacefully rising and status-quoist China”.[22] Consequently, Australia, India, Japan and the US have sought to breathe new life into their Quad; Quad 2.0 has met biannually at a senior official level since 2017, and was subsequently upgraded to the ministerial level in 2019.[23]

At its core, Quad 2.0 aims to maintain regional maritime stability by ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific under the norms of the rules-based global order. Security issues including terrorism, cyber and maritime arenas have consistently been amongst the priority in the agendas of their meetings (See Table 2). Moreover, amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, the Quad held a virtual meeting—which included other countries like Vietnam, New Zealand and South Korea—to strengthen inter-state coordination in mitigating the impact of the pandemic. The agenda of that meeting included issues of vaccine development, repatriation of overseas citizens, and the economic fallout of COVID-19.

However, while they have met twice in November 2017, three times in 2018, and again twice in 2019, the Quad has not issued any joint statement following any of these meetings.[24] The four have only released independent press statements of their perceptions of the outcomes of these meetings.[25]

R. G. Buchan and B. Rimland make the observation that since the meeting in November 2018, Quad 2.0 has emphasised on the continued importance of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in maintaining regional maritime stability.[26] This implies that the minilateral does not intend to undermine or supersede the functions of the multilateral ASEAN.[27]

Table 2: Quad 2.0 Meetings, 2017-2020 

No. Date Location Agenda Level
1. 2017, November[28] Manila Denuclearisation of North Korea, Free and Open Indo-Pacific, protection of rules based order Assistant Secretary Level
2. 2018, January[29] New Delhi Free and Open Indo-Pacific, protection of rules based order, China’s disruption in Indo-Pacific Senior Official Level
3.

2018,

June[30]

Singapore Free, open, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region Senior Official Level
4. 2018, November[31] Singapore Free, open, rules-based and inclusive order in the Indo-pacific region that fosters trust and confidence. Confirmed importance of ASEAN in regional stability Senior Official Level
5. 2019, September[32] New York Topics included disaster relief assistance, airtime and cybersecurity security cooperation, finance and counterterrorism. Reconfirmed importance of ASEAN in regional stability Ministerial Level
6. 2019, November[33] Bangkok Continued discussions from New York meet. In addition included connectivity and infrastructure development and security cooperation in the maritime, cyber and terrorism spheres. Senior Official Level
7. 2020, March[34] Virtual Meeting

Quad-plus – Inclusion of New Zealand, Vietnam and South Korea,

Coordinate efforts to counter Covid-19, Vaccine development, repatriation, global economy

Senior Official Level

A Potential Renewal?

Quad 2.0, much like its first iteration, has suffered because of lack of both coherence and purpose. This is partly because New Delhi has been working to reset its relations with China under the carefully constructed ‘Wuhan Spirit’, since the de-escalation of the two-month-long standoff between the two countries in mid-2017 at the border trijunction in Doklam.[35] New Delhi’s post-Doklam adjustment went so far as to even cancel all rallies of the Dalai Lama and visibly step back from its pro-Tibet stand.[36]

Australia, the only member of Quad 2.0 which has not been part of the Malabar exercises since 2007, has for the last few years been regularly courting India for an invitation. New Delhi has consistently refused, for various reasons. Some analysists point to what they refer to as a “trust deficit” between India and Australia,[37] owing to the latter’s ambiguity regarding its relationship with China, driven in turn by its strategic interests.[38] Other observers have alluded to New Delhi’s continued endeavour to delink the Quad arrangement from the Indo-Pacific.[39] More specifically, it has been suggested that including Australia in the next Malabar exercises would weaponise the Quad. These same analysts argue that conflating the Quad with the Indo-Pacific might unnecessarily provoke China into opening up a new front in the eastern Indian Ocean Region (IOR), where China has so far avoided direct naval confrontation with India.[40] New Delhi should therefore do a careful calculation before it commits itself to a geopolitical framework that effectively further ostracises China, as a mere naval alliance will not substitute for the required technology transfer that will enhance India’s deterrence capabilities in the IOR.[41]

Nonetheless, since 2015, Indo-Australian relations have strengthened, with the first bilateral maritime exercise AUSINDEX held in Vishakhapatnam.[42] The exercises were again held in 2017, off the coast of Freemantle, and in 2019 in the Bay of Bengal.[43] This new generation of Indo-Australian relations has been largely underpinned by the pragmatism of mutual interest.

Most recently, in a virtual summit in June this year, New Delhi upgraded its relationship with Canberra to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”,[44] with agreements over a range of areas including science, infrastructure, terrorism, trade and defence. In defence, the ‘Mutual Logistics Support Arrangement’ was signed, providing the two countries access to each other’s ports and bases.[45] They also signed a Memorandum of Understanding to enhance collaboration between their defence technology and research organisations.

With the steadily growing Indo-Australian interlinkages over the last half a decade or so, it now seems logical for India to take the leap and expand the Malabar from a trilateral to a quadrilateral initiative, and include Australia in the next exercise. This would necessarily conflate the military context from the Malabar exercise with the security framework of the Quad 2.0, providing the much-needed teeth to the Quadrilateral arrangement.

A ‘Weaponised’ Quad

The next Malabar exercise will gain greater significance if Australia is indeed included. It will bring to the forum a renewed willingness to enhance diplomatic and economic coordination in the hope that it will lead eventually to a stronger military alliance. The Quad will then be in a position to address each member state’s strategic vulnerabilities, essentially bringing closer the prospect of a ‘weaponised’ Quad. Japan’s strategic competition with China, especially regarding the disputed Senkaku islands south of Japan, has flared up since the beginning of the decade due to differing historiographies and competition over the islands’ natural resources.[46] However, Japan still brings to the table considerable capital and economic support which make up for its constitutionally limited military capabilities. While Tokyo has made an active effort to modernise its capabilities—including the upgrade of two self-defence force ships to fit in the F-35 stealth fighters—its ability to protect its interests in the larger Indo-Pacific region remains dependent on its alliances.[47]

Today, India’s fundamental vulnerabilities stem from its geographical contiguity with its northern neighbours, Pakistan and more specifically, China with which it shares a 3,488-kilometre-long[48] undefined border. The frequent Sino-Indian border standoffs and the more recent skirmish at the Galwan Valley[49] are symptoms of what is increasingly becoming a zero-sum Sino-Indian relationship. Beijing’s remarkable economic development and its associated military modernisation has only widened the gap between the military capabilities of China and India.

Notwithstanding this, China’s growing influence through OBOR and its expanding presence in the Indian Ocean Region have only heightened anxiety in New Delhi’s strategic circles.[50] In response, India is modernising its capabilities, focusing on protecting its interests in the maritime domain. However, as it protects its strategic interests in the Indian Ocean Region, New Delhi’s scope of contribution is comparatively limited in the larger Indo-Pacific region.[51]

The US, meanwhile, has gone a step further with its growing discourse of a new cold war with China, blaming Beijing for trade malpractices, economic espionage,[52] and its expansionist policies in its neighbourhood. However, being the world’s most powerful tech investor,[53] the US still retains the world’s foremost military capabilities with its leading maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific. While analysts have pointed out the possibility in the future of a receding US influence in the Indo-Pacific, heightened military and economic cooperation amongst the Quad partners would maintain the US’ influence by burden-sharing maritime responsibilities.[54]

Australia has also become increasingly sceptical of not only its economic overdependence on Beijing, but also Beijing’s rising influence in Australian politics.[55] To counter this fear of a ‘weaponised interdependency’,[56] Australia has propagated its ‘Pacific Set-up’ strategy which aims to expand its military and economic interaction in its neighbourhood by providing infrastructure financing and export financing mechanisms worth around AU$3 billion to bolster the economies in its neighbourhood.[57]

The currently escalating Sino-US rhetoric of a ‘Cold War’ and the potential transition of the international order into a multipolar system could conceivably strengthen cooperation within the Quad 2.0. At the same time, the increasing collaboration also appears to be a result of a gradual unification of wider interests amongst the four member states. Moreover, there is a possibility that this four-member grouping might see the participation of other major regional players.

While the Malabar exercises could perhaps create a template for future Quad 2.0 interactions, what remains contentious is the level of actual military assistance this ‘weaponised’ Quad would provide its member states in the event of Chinese aggression or local conflict. This question remains unanswered especially in the light of increasing US isolationism and its rhetoric of calling on regional stakeholders to shoulder more responsibility. What becomes exceedingly clear is that keeping with the historical trajectory of the Quad grouping, unless there are rapid changes in the extent of military coordination and technology dissemination amongst its members, the Quad will find it difficult to evolve from its present-day avatar as a soft balancing tool against regional bullying.

Although the Quad’s present functions of enhancing interoperability, bolstering intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance proficiencies remain foundational in any military coordination,[58] its members should actively cooperate to build each other’s economic, technological and military capabilities to counter China. Without this enhancement, the Quad’s goals—maintaining Indo-Pacific stability, challenging regional bullying, strengthening economic independence, and protecting the free and open Indo-Pacific under the rules-based order—will remain a distant dream.

Conclusion

Australia’s possible participation in the next Malabar exercises would come as a natural result of a progression in bilateral diplomatic relations, coupled with the compulsions driven by ongoing strategic shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. While threats to regional security have heightened in recent times, it would be an oversimplification to attribute the current strengthening of Quad 2.0 ties entirely to the decline of Sino-Indian relations. More pertinently, although Australia’s addition would indeed send a strong message to China—as India exhibits to the world its desire to play the role it perceives for itself—New Delhi should also work on securing real naval technology transfers to enhance its actual deterrence capabilities in IOR.

The growing instability in the international order, including the weakening of US influence in the Indo-Pacific, makes a stronger case for the protection of the global commons. While the level of future integration depends on a variety of evolving domestic and international factors, what is certain is that with the potential inclusion of Australia in Malabar and an enhanced commitment to this alignment of democracies, Quad 2.0 would perhaps cease being disregarded. The Quad would increasingly be able to prove itself beyond being merely a “foam in the Ocean, destined to dissipate soon.”[59]


About the Authors

Prof. Harsh V Pant is Director of Studies and Head of Strategic Studies Programme at ORF. Anant Singh Mann is a Research Intern at ORF.


Endnotes

[a] The 2020 Malabar exercises will likely be cancelled due to the Covid-19 pandemic.

[b] Potential inclusion of Australia in Malabar 2020.

[c] Expected location of Malabar 2020.

[1] Harsh V Pant and Premesha Saha, “India’s Pivot to Australia”, Foreign Policy, July 21, 2020 (Accessed on 12/08/2020).

[2] Gurpreet S. Khurana, “‘Malabar’ Naval Exercises: Trends and Tribulations”, Issue Brief Published in National Maritime Foundation (NMF), August 5, 2014, (Accessed on 16/07/2020).

[3] Ibid.

[4] Jagannath Panda, “India and the ‘Quad Plus’ Dialogue,” RUSI, June 12, (Accessed on 17/07/2020).

[5] Asha Sundaramurthy, “India Keeps Australia out of the Malabar Exercise – Again”, The Diplomat, May 8, 2018 (Accessed on 17/07/2020).

[6] H. D. P. Envall, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue: Towards an Indo-Pacific Order?” Policy Report in S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), September, 2019, (Accessed on 17/07/2020).

[7] Reported by Stephen McDonell, “Transcript: Nelson Meets China over Military Relationship”, ABC News, July 9, 2007, (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[8] Hiroko Nakata, “Abe Announces he will Resign,” The Japanese Times, September 13, 2007, (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[9] R. Nicholas Burns, “Media Roundtable in Singapore,” U.S. Department of State Archive News, December 3, 2007 (Accessed on 17/07/2020 from).

[10] Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Japan to Join Malabar as Permanent Participant,” Defence News, October 13, 2015, (Accessed on 17/07/2020).

[11] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei’s Regular Press Conference, December 14, 2015, (Accessed on 17/07/2020). 

[12] Ravi Tomar, “India-US Relations in a Changing Strategic EnvironmentParliament of Australia: Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, Research Paper no. 20 2001-2002, June 25, 2002,  (Accessed on 17/07/2020).

[13] Khurana, “‘Malabar’ Naval Exercises: Trends and Tribulations”.

[14] D. M. Sirmans, “Trilateral Air Defence Exercise Launches Malabar 2015”, Story number: NNS151017-03 in America’s Navy: Forged by the Sea, October 17, 2015 (Accessed on 16/07/2020 from); and Consulate General Chennai, “U.S., India, Japan Navies to Participate in Malabar 2015” in U.S. Embassy and Consulates in India, October 14, 2015, (Access on 16/07/2020 from).

[15] MC2 Ryan J. Bathelder and John C. Stennis, “Three Nations Set Sail for Exercise Malabar 2016” in USS Mobile Bay: America’s Navy: Pacific Fleet Service Ships, June 16, 2016, (Accessed on 16/07/2020); and “Press Release: Exercise Malabar” in Indian Navy, 2016 (Access on 16/07/2020).

[16]Exercise Malabar Commences in Bay of Bengal/ North Indian Ocean” in Press Release: Indian Navy, (Access on 16/07/2020).

[17] MC2 William McCann, “U.S., JMSDF, Indian Naval Forces Conclude Malabar 2018”, Commander, U.S. 7th Fleet, June 19, 2018, (Accessed on 16/07/2020 from).

[18]Ministry of Defence: Exercise MALABAR 2019”, in Press Information Bureau, 25 September 25, 2019, (Accessed on 16/07/2020).

[19] Sudhi Ranjan Sen and Archana Chaudhary, “India to invite Australia for Naval Drill, Risking Beijing’s Ire”, Bloomberg, July 10, 2020, (Accessed on 17/07/2020).

[20] Patrick Gerard Buchan and Benjamin Rimland, “Report: Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue,” Center For Strategic and International Studies CSIS, March 16 2020, (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[21] Rory Medcalf, Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2020), p. 18. pp. 251-252.

[22] Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’”, War on the Rocks, November 16, 2017 (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[23] Sriram Lakshman, “Quad’s Significance rises as Ministers meet,” The Hindu, September 27, 2019, (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[24] Andrew O’Neil and Lucy West, “Why the Quad Won’t ever be an Asian NATO,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, January 24, 2019, (Accessed on 17/07/2020).

[25] Ibid.

[26] Buchan and Rimland, “Report: Defining the Diamond: The Past, Present and Future of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue”.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29]Navy Chiefs of India, Japan, Australia and US share dais at Raisina Dialogue 2018 in Delhi”, The New Indian Express, January 18, 2018, (Accessed on 21/07/2020).

[30] Ankit Panda, “US, Japan, India, and Australia Hold Senior Official-Level Quadrilateral Meeting in Singapore,” The Diplomat, June 8, 2018, (Accessed on 21/07/2020)

[31]India, US, Japan, Australia hold ‘Quad’ meet”, The Statesman, November 15, 2018, (Accessed on 21/07/2020).

[32] Lakshman, “Quad’s Significance rises as Ministers meet”.

[33]‘Quad’ Leaders Meet in Bangkok”, The Times of India, November 4, 2019, (Accessed on 21/07/2020).

[34] Jeff F. Smith, “How America is Leading the “Quad Plus” Group of 7 Countries in Fighting the Coronavirus,” The Heritage Foundation, April 1, 2020, (Accessed on 21/07/2020).

[35] A. P. Singh, “What Shapes India’s View on the Quad?The Diplomat, November 28, 2019, (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[36] S. Haidar and J. Joseph, “No Australian Presence in Naval Drills,” The Hindu, April 29, 2018, (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[37] Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad’”.

[38] Vinay Kaura, “Incorporating Indo-Pacific and Quadrilateral into India’s Strategic Outlook,” Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 15, no. 2 (January 29, 2020): p. 93.

[39] Vivek Mishra and Udayan Das, “India’s Understanding of the Quad and Indo-Pacific: Distinct Narrative or a Flawed One?Observer Research Foundation, March 19, 2019 (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[40] Abhijit Singh, “Make the Right Call on ‘Malabar’ Going Quad,Observer Research Foundation, July 20, 2020) (Accessed on 22/07/2020).

[41] Ibid.

[42] Ministry of External Affairs, GOI, “India–Australia Bilateral Relations”, February 6, 2020, (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[43] Ibid.

[44] Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India (hereafter GOI), “Joint Statement on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between Republic of India and Australia,Media Center, June 4, 2020, (Accessed on 18/07/2020).

[45] Harsh V. Pant and Niranjan Chandrashekhar Oak, “Locating the Mutual Logistics Support Agreement in India-Australia Strategic Relations”, ORF Issue Brief No. 316, September 2019, Observer Research Foundation,

[46] Koichi Sato, “The Senkaku Islands Dispute: Four Reasons of the Chinese Offensive – A Japanese View,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 8, no. 1 (June 23, 2019): pp. 50-82.

[47] Lavina Lee, “Assessing the Quad: Prospects and Limitations of Quadrilateral Cooperation for Advancing Australia’s interests,Lowy Institute, May 19, 2020, (Accessed on 19/07/2020).

[48] Mihir Bhonsale, “Understanding Sino-Indian Border Issues: An Analysis of Incidents reported in the Indian media”, Occasional Paper 143, February 2018, Observer Research Foundation (Accessed on 19/07/2020).

[49] The Galwan Valley incident was a scuffle between Indian and Chinese soldiers that took place on June 15-16 and was a result of the Sino-Indian border standoff along the Line of Actual Control that had been ongoing since early May 2020. For a detailed survey of the sequence of events, see HT Correspondent, “The Galwan Valley Face-off explained through 17 news reports,” Hindustan Times, June 22, 2020. .

[50] Sundaramurthy, “India Keeps Australia out of the Malabar Exercise – Again”.

[51] Lee, “Assessing the Quad: Prospects and Limitations of Quadrilateral Cooperation for Advancing Australia’s interests”.

[52] Andrew Grossman, “U.S. Charges Six Chinese Citizens with Economic Espionage,The Wall Street Journal, May 19, 2015, (Accessed on 19/07/2020).

[53] Sunil Chacko, “Quad’s Operation HQ Should be Andaman,The Sunday Guardian, June 11, 2020, (Accessed on 19/07/2020).

[54] Lee, “Assessing the Quad: Prospects and Limitations of Quadrilateral Cooperation for Advancing Australia’s interests”.

[55]Middle Kingdom: Australia Battles Chinese Political Influence,The Economist, June 15, 2017, (Accessed on 19/07/2020).

[56] Medcalf, Indo-Pacific Empire: China, America and the Contest for the World’s Pivotal Region, pp. 182-184.

[57] Lee, “Assessing the Quad: Prospects and Limitations of Quadrilateral Cooperation for Advancing Australia’s interests”.

[58] Ibid.

[59] Minister of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, Wang Yi quoted in Ashok Rai, “Quadrilateral Security Dialogue 2 (Quad 2.0) – a credible strategic construct or a ‘foam in the Ocean’,” Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime Foundation of India 14, no. 2 (March 11, 2019): p. 139.

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